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THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN A CHANGING SOCIETY  
 
It is a postulate in any democratic society, that its governability depends, in 
the end, on the effective degree of citizens’ internalization of democratic values. The 
first one of these values is, undoubtedly, civic responsibility, co-responsibility in 
collective affairs, -direct or indirect- participation in the process of political action 
which constitutes the very same dynamics of the democratic regime. To govern the 
subjects is not really to govern, but only t  be in command. To govern, in democracy, 
is not to manage, but to direct and redress in a coordinated way the convergence of 
a common project, integrating the plural actions of individuals and of conscious and 
free groups. Thus, governability implies making this convergence possible, 
integrating the various social interests and the various individual projects in a 
political order that, at least, should be functional and effective; that is to say, it 
should allow for a common public policy and, at the same time, assume pluralism 
and existing differences. Such governability is, then, directly affected by the kind of 
political culture (values, attitudes and behaviors) of the governors. The more they 
identify with the system, the rules and the democratic functioning on a day to day 
basis, the better democracy is reinforced and the better it works. On the contrary: the 
less interested citizens are in the democratic processes and in the outcome of the 
political system, the weaker and the less effective its functioning will be. 
 
Consequently, democracy is a regime of government in which the governors 
and the governed are inevitably interrelated by means of a reciprocal dependency. 
The building up of a democratic political culture among the population depends on 
the action of the former and on their fidelity to the democratic model. Such a political 
culture nourishes the more or less exemplary action of the governors. 
 
The second postulate of democracy as a way of life and of coexistence is the 
real and effective participation of the citizens. However, such participation is a form 
of behavior which, like all behaviors, has its origins in personal values and attitudes 
which consider participating in a collective enterprise as a demonstration of 
solidarity which morally enriches and improves the individual. Nevertheless, the 
values and the attitudes related to participation are desiderata as they depend on 
the psychic reality. In the reciprocal relationship of interdependency governors-
governed, the latter may experience stimulus or disappointments. Not everything 
depends on their political and moral culture, because this culture is precisely 
influenced by many cultural, institutional and governing factors. The moral and 
political culture of any citizen is his own share of the political and moral collective 
culture which includes the entire system and the functioning of democracy. 
 
The postulates on the theory and practice of these societies politically 
organized as democracies are evidently, their foundation. However, when a society 
-as ours- is undergoing an accelerated process of transformation, the crisis of 
values, changes in motivation, perplexity of attitudes and alteration of behavior 
inevitably affect the image, the perception and the personal experience citizens have 
of political life. And even the very same democratic model may be questioned. 
 
We may say that the image which is being altered most in the present period 
of change is the image of the State. The efficiency of this historical instrument to 
organize political societies has been mortally wounded as the complexity of 
economic and social life and the very same active conscience of citizens have 
created new sovereign decision-making structures for issues that are very important 
for the population. On the one hand, the globalization of economy and the 
international communications network have enormously reduced the scope of real 
power and autonomy of nation-states. On the other hand, new political powers have 
emerged in the nation-states, with deeper roots in the various natural and cultural 
sections of society, demanding self-government and self-administration of their own 
interests in order to reach a higher representativity and efficiency. 
 
In such an historical context, government becomes more delicate, more 
necessary and, at the same time, more difficult. Democratic participation, as an 
expression of values and attitudes negatively unaffected by the phenomena of 
change may reach a crisis point since, up to now, it has been primarily related to the 
state functioning as a monopolizing structure in political life. 
 
In any case, such a crisis is polyvalent. On the one hand, it has a negative 
aspect as it threatens the grounds for democratic coexistence. However, on the 
other hand, it also has a positive aspect as it expresses, though unconsciously so, 
such a de-legitimization of the nation-state as an example for the efficient resolution 
of serious problems related to social upheaval. The crisis of the welfare state, of the 
affairs related to the treasury, of the national sovereignties, the changing capacity for 
autonomous decision-making in every government demands new formulae of 
legitimization and new structures of political action which are represented, in a 
negative way, by some forms of specific non-participative behavior. To some extent, 
we could affirm that non-participation is not related to the democratic model in 
general, but to a specific and contextual expression of it. As we stated previously, 
the political culture of participation or abstention, or of politicization or non-
politicization cannot be separated from the global culture. 
 
There are some structural factors which decisively condition the individual 
political culture, the subjective basis of concrete democracy. Such factors may be 
basically classified in three big groups: cultural, institutional and governmental. 
Specifically concerning the serious problem of anti-participative non-politicization in 
our country as well as all around the state, these three groups of structural elements 
negatively and strongly influence the political culture of Catalan and Spanish citizens 
for various historical reasons which are still important today. In the present report we 
will have to find out which of those specific factors are common to Western 
democratic societies and which add a unique element, that is, only common to our 
reality. However, as a first approach, we will have to see how such a singularity 
originates in the accelerated changes which have taken place in the last decade in 
Western societies which have a peculiar historical background of non-democratic 
tradition and a recent past that almost c mpletely eradicated participative and 
democratic values. 
 
It is not by chance that, since 1988, the Institut de Ciències Polítiques i 
Socials (ICPS) of Barcelona has started a line of research into electoral abstention. 
The contributions of Montero and Font in issue number 10 on Electoral Studies, J. 
Font’s PhD dissertation on cultural abstention in the metropolitan areas of Madrid 
and Barcelona (1993), the analysis of the abstentionists based on the marked lists of 
the electoral census (Pallarès, Font, Canals, Borge), and the analysis of interviews 
(Virós) constitute the result of the research carried out. 
 
Cultural Factors 
 
These factors express the present political culture of Spaniards, and, more 
precisely, of the citizens of Catalonia. As always, such a culture is firstly made up of 
the historical tradition received, more or less consciously or unconsciously 
internalized. Secondly, it consists of the participation in the collective inner 
experiencing of the present political life, basically through "clichés" transmitted by 
the instruments that create opinion. 
 
1) The Tradition of Political Culture 
 
The almost absolute lack of democratic tradition and also secular political 
illiteracy in our country reached their maximum height during the forty years f the 
Francoist regime. The 17 years of recent democracy don't seem to have brought with 
them a substantial redressing of such a negative tradition. In this sense, the lack of 
any educational constitutes one of its most remarkable and significant aspects. 
 
The ignorance of the complexity of the political phenomena (social, political-
economic and even of social psychology) explains the mentality and some of the 
attitudes in relation to civic participation and the understanding of the political 
system which are, generally speaking, clearly emotional (going from the traditional 
Messianic idealism of the Hispanics to the complementary defeatist skepticism: 
"there is nothing to do," "we had better just look out for ourselves"). In this sense, 
"betrayals" to ideals, instead of being considered as objective complaints based, on 
an ideological conviction, are looked on as "immoral" behavior or as universal and 
eternal fatalism: "finally, they all do the same, and it always happens like that". 
 
On the other hand, this chronic disenchantment, as long as it is caused by 
historical facts which are happening again at present, has an objective basis. 
Therefore, the persistence of the "disenchantment" expresses a certain degree of 
good health in the moral and political sensitivity of the abstentionist. Fraud is not 
possible anymore. At any rate, we may find resignation or indifference, but never 
integration in a fraudulent system, which, conversely, maintains itself thanks to this 
attitude, it needs it, and, coherently, provokes it over and over again. 
 
2) The Present Political Culture 
 
The anti-participative structure of the political life of the present state should 
be added to this tradition of "lack of political culture"; this structure is characteristic 
of Western democracies with a democratic tradition. The impact on the political 
culture -historically transmitted- of the everyday messages of the media (television, 
radio, press) -not to mention here the institutional and governmental structures- has 
failed to redress this lack of culture received; in addition, it has also reinforced the 
attitudes and the mentality fostered by Francoism, grounding itself -with more or less 
good faith and sincerity- on the claim that Spanish democracy functions 
inadequately. The "reasons" of the abstentionists appear to be, to a great extent, 
pure repetitions of what the media say, implicit acts of faith in the correct knowledge 
and the honesty of the afore-m ntioned media, as opposed to the spontaneous lack 
of confidence in the ruling class nd in the parties. 
 
Institutional Factors 
 
To the "pre-state" tradition of the Spanish state ("caudillism", that is, Spanish 
bossism, favoritism, caciquism, militarism, elitism, etc.) "post-state" novelty has been 
added, consisting of techno-burocracy, partycracy, "oligarchization" of the executive 
bodies of the parties, control of parliaments by the executive powers and, generally 
speaking, of all the structural and functional elements which characterize a divorce 
between citizens and Politics. One of the most representative examples of this 
situation is given by the very same electoral system and, especially, the campaigns 
of the leaders and of their parties: the gigantic scenery of betrayed promises. 
 
Ultimately, disenchantment as regards to parties has originated in their 
"incapacity" to govern citizens as they would like to be or say they would like to be 
governed. The system of institutional communication represented by the parties in a 
democratic regime seems to fail. Moreover, this is so, regardless of extreme-right or 
extreme-left ideologies. However, it is also true that parties, as they are conceived, 
designed and put into practice, are "inefficient" because the state constitutional 
bodies are not the most adequate to develop the policies that citizens still believe 
correspond to the state as it is. Neither the "liberal" abstentionists who believe in the 
free economic and social interplay (conservative anarchists), nor the "authoritarian" 
abstentionists who believe in a fair, equal and compulsory order (progressive 
dictators) can trust in parliamentarism as the place where interests are conciliated 
nor in the governments as the executors of popular will. The decentralization of 
political power by means of what has been called the State of the Autonomies does 
not seem to have reduced this skepticism in Catalan abstentionists. The abstention 
in the autonomous elections would confirm the belief that the autonomous 
government is inoperative: a government that, despite being autonomous, is a 
government as well, and, therefore as "inefficient" as the central one. 
 
Factors Related to Government 
 
Apart from the ideological reasons of the abstentionists, caused by this lack of 
participative culture or by moral disenchantment, the "possibilist" and "conservative" 
pragmatism of men and women of all sorts could stop abstentionism (as it sometimes 
does) if the behavior of governments, their way of putting their policies into practice, 
or the more or less direct communication with citizens achieved a certain material or 
psychic efficiency. 
 
Nevertheless, the price paid for the complete incorporation of Spanish society 
into the world economic system has implied and will continue to imply for a part of 
the population, an eventual reason for refusal or indifference. Such a phenomenon 
has its positive side since, as happened with the historical pessimism of Spaniards, 
it implies a reasonable loss of confidence in the state, the governors, the parties and 
the professional politicians as the means of solving the main collective and personal 
problems of the population. However, such a loss of a Messianic and excessive 
confidence is not balanced by any other kind of confidence, for, who other than the 
"politicians" can govern society and solve its conflicts and needs? 
 
In this sense, the non-integration in the present system of government of 
some critical abstentionists could imply a certain hope for a future more influenced 
by the ecologist movement, by broadening areas of political organization (federal 
Europe), and even by the glimmer of a world scale government. 
 
The focus of our research must, however, go beyond the above mentioned 
factors. They must force us to accurately research into how they reflect the 
subjective image of the abstentionist citizens, who, as we already said, do not 
always have negative reasons for their refusal to participate in the system. On the 
other hand, the conformist or simply "ritual" support of many participant citizens can 
also collaborate to maintain structures without any capacity for self-criticism and, 
therefore, condemned to an inertia which nourishes its legitimization among the 
population. We have to bear in mind that another postulate of democracy is that the 
very same people are the driving force of political life, for the better or for the worse, 
with or without their participation. If the well-known cliché which says that "any 
country has the government it deserves" makes any sense it is because it considers 
the structural factors of a culture to be the desired or undesired product of the very 
same citizens. 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY AND DETAILS OF THE 
METHODOLOGY USED 
 
Generally speaking, the present study tries to look in depth into the motives 
for electoral abstention among Catalan citizens, paying special attention to youth. 
 
Once we have obtained some interesting details on the evolution and 
participation in our country based on aggregated data1 and on the interviews, our 
aim is to complement and to elaborate on them using the analysis of almost a 
hundred interviews carried out in Catalonia between 1989 and 19902. 
 
Our main objective is to understand the phenomenon of abstention starting 
from the analysis of the political culture of a specific group of Catalan citizens. 
 
In the first part of the study that we will now summarize, we undertake political 
culture to be a descriptive tool, leaving, for a second comparative stage of the study, 
its use as an explanatory variable of the detected differences in political behavior of 
citizens of various countries (Elkins and Simeon, 1979). 
 
Outline for the Analysis of Abstention 
 
The fact of voting or abstaining depends on a collection of interrelated factors 
which intervene in a complex process of mental operations which lead the citizen to 
decide in one sense or another. 
 
Table1 
 
The voter is conditioned by two decisive factors: his personal history, 
inscribed in the collective history (which also includes his previous electoral 
behavior) and the cultural context of the political community to which he belongs. 
 
The voter also finds himself "placed" in a specific local environment (spatial 
status) in which he experiences, at the moment of voting, the influence of some of 
the features of the social environment. Family socialization, which naturally transmits 
values and a vision of the world, and the networks of professional and personal 
relationships as well as of associative activities (culture, sport, trade unions...) also 
influence his decision. 
 
On the other hand (top of the table), the political institutions pretend to 
integrate the voter in a democratic dynamic through political parties and the 
leadership of its rulers. 
 
The latter offer their policies put into practice as a legitimization of their 
government action and, as an offer for the future, their government electoral 
programs. The link between the parties, the leaders, and the voters is constituted by 
the media in any form whatsoever. 
 
The personal factors of the voter which contribute to the taking of a decision 
to vote, are his mental predispositions –habitus- (Bourdieu, 1976), partly 
unconscious, his -more or less coherent- ideology, the opinions and beliefs shared 
with the social groups to which he belongs and the information provided by the 
media. The habitus -filters for the perception of the reality and lines of behavior- 
originate in the family environment, while the opinions and beliefs are nourished by 
the non-family relationship network among which we have to include the educational 
system. In the constitution of a more or less coherent ideology, all the above 
mentioned elements intervene, together with the political information directly 
channeled by the political parties and, especially, by the media. 
 
Through ideology and environmental political information, the voter has some 
elements which allow him to evaluate wh ther or not among the political options 
present in the electoral panorama there exists one which fits his personal and/or 
collective priorities. It is precisely based on his -more or less unconscious- 
predispositions and on his opinions and socially shared beliefs that the voter 
establishes his subjective preferences. From the interaction between his permanent 
values and his present interests, his convictions and the opinion of the nearby 
groups, comes a synthesis, the electoral decision. 
 
From all these elements and reflection processes we have mentioned and 
have tried to describe, we may distinguish two different but complementary lines 
which converge in the electoral decision and which originate, on the one hand, in the 
spatial and family status (geographical context) and, on the other, in the socio-
economic status and in the networks of external relationships. The first one tends to 
express the aspects basically related to the personal experience, non-rational and 
emotional (values, attitudes); the second one usually expresses a higher rationality 
or adjustment to the practical interests shared by the groups which form the "social 
nature" of the voter. 
 
The line preferentially related to the "personal experience" leads to 
identification processes -usually with a strong emotional component- to parties which 
basically have leaders for whom ideology is more or less relevant. The 
communication system constituted by the media re-el borates the process of being 
conscious of the habitus and of the ideology of the voter who, depending on the 
situation, will feel more influenced by factors related to ideology or to the parties or 
by other factors related to emotion and leadership. 
 
The line preferentially "rational" or of interests is strongly related to the 
observed contrast between the policies put into force and of the proposed 
governmental programs. Concerning one or the other, the media provide the 
"objective" information elements which will have to fill the voter's decision with 
"rationality" and complete and correct the public opinion formed by the whole of the 
opinions and beliefs emerging from the population in relation to collective or group 
interests. Such a dimension, usually quite emotional, corresponds to the practical 
and social interest as it is perceived by the voter and tends to balance the most 
"instinctive" aspects acquired within the family and in the original cultural 
environment. 
 
Our scheme helps us to understand how the processes of primary and 
secondary socialization influence the perception the citizen has of the political 
system, the institutions, the parties and the leaders, and their critical evaluation; it 
also allows us to understand the genesis and the interrelation of the elements which 
are taken into consideration in the classical studie  on political culture. 
 
If we wish to look in depth into the factors which have an influence in 
abstention, we will have to bear in mind that these play different roles depending on 
the space and time. That is to say that the change in the geographic and so i l 
environment may modify the relative influence of the above mentioned elements. 
Socio-political and personal circumstances have a very strong influence on electoral 
decision. Hirschman3 wisely reminds us of the episodes of mobilization-de-
mobilization which usually take place in someone's lifetime. 
 
Generally speaking, socio-economic factors and those related to original 
culture have a usually indirect impact (excepting the extreme cases of social 
marginality) as factors which condition the perception of the "political game" by the 
voter as something close to him which affects him and in which he gets involved or, 
on the contrary, as a series of events he hardly understands and on which he does 
not believe he can have an influence. 
 
A hypothesis which seems to confirm itself is that the socio-economic factors 
tend to have less weight because the so called "communication society" stimulates 
political discourses shared by wide groups despite their individual positions in the 
social hierarchy. 
 
Adults are the ones who still bear the marks of the historical conflicts that 
were produced by ideological affiliation. For the young people born in the mid sixties, 
it is much more difficult to place themselves on the Right/Left scale. We have to 
specify that in the short period of the democratic transition (1977-1982) there was a 
moment of generalized hyper politicization in society which marked the adolescents 
and young people who were spectators or privileged actors and who have in time 
maintained a more participative tendency4. 
 
The fact that the education level has been increasing in the whole of the 
population means that, theoretically, the capacity of the population to participate in 
politics has also increased, not only because of more information being made 
available, but also because of the greater capacity for political conceptualization 
and, consequently, to contrast personal preferences -i dividual and collective- with 
the different political options on offer. A high level of conceptualization also allows 
one to grasp the extension of the political options, the differences among the various 
political programs and to dominate the strategies to reach goals5. 
 
If this is so, it is clear that the citizens of Western countries will be the most 
well-informed and critical judges of the policies of the various governments; 
however, this does not assure that it will lead them to make use of their vote as a co-
responsibility tool in the leadership of society. A quick diagnosis of electoral 
abstention has lead many analysts to say that citizens who do not vote are un-civic, 
while a more accurate interpretation may show them as silent witnesses of old-
fashioned partisan organizations and of political discourses which have, for the large 
part, lost their signs of ideological identity and in which it is difficult to find a logical 
or coherent argument for their government programs6. 
 
Interviews 
 
The objective of the study, the first results of which are presented here, is a 
qualitative approximation to the phenomenon of abstention based on long interviews 
(between I and 1:30 hours), recorded and afterwards analyzed by various teams in 
order to be able to detect eventual deviations in their interpretation and obtain 
consistent results. It seems to us that the interview is a good methodological 
approximation tool since our study puts special emphasis on the collective 
representations of the social groups and on the interaction, reproduction and change 
in meaning system processes, as well as on their influence in the relations among 
the various elements playing a role in politics. 
 
Interviews favor the comprehensive analysis of the political discourse of the 
voters and allow us to confirm the coexistence of various systems of meaning in our 
Western societies (Geertz, 1988), as well as the possible existence in a very same 
individual of more than one order of preferences (Hirschman, 1982; Elster, 1983). 
This would explain, to a great extent, the variability in behavior (politicians included) 
in a reduced period of time as well as the stages of implication/un-implication in 
politics throughout a citizen's lifetime. 
 
It was easy to interview young people: voters and abstentionists; however, we 
had many more difficulties with adult abstentionists, for more than a half of the 
people contacted refused to be interviewed7. Their arguments for not accepting the 
interview were diverse and depended on their socio-cultural level. 
 
In the wealthy districts of the city, the most current excuse was related to work 
(going on a professional or vacation trip). In the peripheral areas or in Ciutat Vella 
(old quarter of Barcelona), the reasons for refusing were more related to the lack of 
confidence in strangers and even to less "polite" attitudes: some hung up the 
telephone, others said that the subject did not interest them and that they did not 
want to collaborate, or they even agreed to be interviewed and, afterwards, they did 
not want to open the door. It is interesting to underline the aggressive role of many 
husbands who were against our interviewing their wives. 
 
Generally speaking, in all districts there are more women who refuse to speak 
about these issues. Thus, we detected: feelings of control refusal, of a kind of "guilt" 
for their abstaining -internalization of civic duty-, as well as a feeling of a lack of 
personal self-confidence and of conceptual confusion in these subjects. 
 
One of the problems, in polls as well as in interviews, is that they put pressure 
on the citizen to force him to express himself on many issues he might have never 
thought about before. In order to find out how much the experimental situation of an 
interview may force one to express opinions (which in fact, aren't "true" opinions, 
since there is a previous lack of knowledge on the topic of the conversation), we 
asked a group of young people to write a biography with the same script used as 
guidance in the interviews. The results were quite interesting. They narrated -often 
with a great many details- their childhood, school, their relationship with parents, 
friends, sport, and cultural interests. In most of the cases, there was only very little 
reference to their opinions on politics and society. 
 
The results made the exact position which politics occupy in the interests of 
youth very clear8. 
 
 
SOME CONCLUSIONS ON YOUTH ABSTENTION 
 
According to the European Community poll on youth (1982), interest in politics 
increases with age; they also give more support to post-materialist values 
(environmental protection, human rights, freedom, equality among sexes...). 
Compared to adults, an equal percentage (40%) believe that they can do something 
to change society. 16% are interested in politics, approximately only 5% belong to 
parties or civic-political associations. Only 29% identify themselves in some way with 
a political party. 
 
The poll carried out by the Ministry of Culture (1982) shows that 47% of young 
people don't take any position on the Left-Right scale and that 40% say that they 
don't know who to vote for; ideological distribution is similar to that of adults, the 
center and center-left positions predominating with a minimum presence of extreme 
positions of any kind. In comparative data, in 1968, 50% of young people were 
interested in politics, 80% in 1977 (the first democratic elections) and 40% in 1982. 
Among the 15-17 year old age range, the lack of interest expressed in politics is 
even stronger; this does not mean that they are not interested in the problems 
citizens have to face. 
 
The majority show enthusiasm for the Constitution and the King, and only 4% 
think that Parliament and parties are important (elements of Francoist socialization? 
Personalization of power and lack of confidence in parties). Only one out of ten 
young people affirms that he would support a revolutionary action. A very small 
number of young people are associated and only 3% affirms that they are affiliated 
to political parties. 
 
Concerning participation in public demonstrations of any sort, only 25% have 
participated. 
 
In the poll carried out by the City Hall of Barcelona in 1984 (Projecte Jove–
Youth Project), 65% had participated in some public demonstration: September 11th, 
for peace, for or against abortion or against nuclear power stations. 80% identify with 
any kind of rights movement. Only 2% are affiliated. 40% belong to some civic or 
sports associations. Although being the most active city in Spain, only 27% of young 
people from Barcelona don't place themselves on the Right-Left scale. Concerning 
ideologies, the one that has the most support is socialism followed by nationalism 
and, further down on the list, anarchism. 
 
More than half of the sample believe that Catalonia is a nation and 32% that it 
is not. 44% of the young citizens feel more Catalan than Spanish; 34% both and 
16% more Spanish than Catalan. 19% would be in favor of independence or of a 
confederation of states, 15% in favor of a federal state, 29% in favor of the 
autonomous communities and 9% for a unitarian state. Not even a quarter affirm that 
they trust political parties, the army, the church, the trade unions or the public 
administration. The school and the City Council surpass 50% and family, like 
everywhere in Europe is the institution which deserves most confidence. The 
youngest follow their parents' ideology more closely. The girls are more abstentionist 
than the boys and their vote is less stable. Social class conditions the level of the 
answers to political questions as well as the orientation of the vote. 
 
According to a post-electoral poll carried out by CIS (Center for Sociological 
Research) in 1987, 7% of young Catal ns give support to the HB candidature and to 
the EA-ERC-PNG coalition, a number which fits the number of boys that in 1984 
defined themselves as exclusively Catalan. Only 26% of boys and girls define 
themselves as sympathizing or somehow identifying themselv s with some specific 
party. There are no other differences between the young people and the global 
sample other than that the latter place themselves more in the 1-2 positions -extreme 
left-. There is no doubt about what seems to be a stronger tendency among youth 
towards the left, but their behavior is very unstable, without a strong politicization 
and without partisan socialization. 
 
The convergent vote is more stable, while the one on the left moves more or 
less depending on the kind of election and the impact of the campaign (the kind of 
subjects dealt with in the campaign). 
 
We have to point out the need for reflection on the higher degree of relative 
mobilization of the young concerned elites who are in favor, on the one hand, of a 
critical approach to the system and remain outside of the electoral race and, on the 
other hand, show a tendency towards more conservative positions -to a great extent, 
disguised by a national radicalization. 
 
The CIS post-electoral poll of July 1988 confirms that young people are less 
keen to refuse questions on the intention to vote. It seems that abstention among 
youth –18-25 age range, is higher than among the rest of the population. However, 
such data has to be broken down among the 18-21 and 22-25 age ranges. It clearly 
appears that young people are more hesitant concerning if they will vote and who 
they will vote for. Girls tend to abstain more than boys. 
 
From 1984 (Projecte Jove) until 1988 (CIS), we can identify an increase 
among young people who feel only Catalan. On the contrary, the number of those 
who feel only Spanish diminishes. 
 
The number of those who don't place themselves on the Left-Right scale also 
diminishes, although the number among girls is higher. There is no difference 
between girls and boys in placing themselves on the national identification scale. 
Such a tendency to identify with a territorial boundary is not, for the majority, a 
dimension with a political content, and, therefore there are less girls who don’t 
express themselves. 
 
The reasons for the CIS poll of 1988 -post- may be divided into lack of 
interest and lack of politicization. It is also necessary to clarify concepts. What do we 
understand by political space and, therefore, by politicization. We also have to 
establish the difference between political participation and non electoral 
participation. 
From the analysis of the in depth interviews carried out, some conclusions may be 
drawn. We state them here in a summary form:
 
Ideological Reproduction 
 
Ideological transmission from parents to children exists in quite a high degree. 
Most of young people reproduce the mental schemes, the incoherence and the 
contradictions of their parents. This happens mainly at both extremes of the social 
scale9, especially when there have been no changes in the economic situation of the 
family. We have also found this to happen in the Left-Right dimension, as well as in 
that of national identification. Concerning religion, young people tend to feel less 
involved in relation to dogma and liturgy; thus, the children of practicing parents 
often declare themselves non-practicing believers, while the children of non-
practicing parents declare themselves agnostics. 
 
In the case of nationalism, the opposite is true: the children of moderate 
Catalan nationalists may be radical nationalists or proponents of an independent 
Catalonia. In the case of mixed couples, in which parents come from different 
cultural environments, if there is an explicit conflict within the couple, the children 
often solve the tensions by not involving themselves in the problem. If the families 
are not especially sensitive to this subject, it may well be that their children, 
influenced by the social environment (in a clear process of "re-catalanization") will 
be, or at least declare themselves, to be more active nationalists. 
 
In middle classes (basically in those which have modified their social status), 
there are more acute differences between parents and children. In some very 
conservative and religious families we observe young people who admit to be 
atheist, while in other nationalist families, the young say that for them nationalism is 
bourgeois, narrow-minded or old-fashioned. 
 
In the families with a leftist tradition, the children also tend to separate from 
the parties voted for by their paents, since they see deep contradictions in their 
ideological tradition and the concrete policies they carry out. 
 
It is in conservative families where me may notice more confusion which is the 
result of the gap between implicit inherited values and new valu s that rule daily life 
(conservative boys and girls accept divorce, homosexuality, and euthanasia). 
 
Most of the young people who are not involved in politics come from families 
who, because of the low level of political information, or the result of precarious 
education, or because of apolitical conservatism are implicit supporters of the 
system (any system). Such a conclusion is coherent with the results of previous 
research. Conservative families often transmit a negative attitude -more or less 
diffuse- towards politics. 
 
The politicized families of right wing ideology (more or less explicit Francoist 
parents) have children that, while they often don't identify themselves with the 
previous regime and accept democracy, they, in fact, share their family's lack of 
confidence in political parties and partisan politics. 
 
The active critical abstentionists come, for the most part, from families whose 
children define as being open-minded, leftist or progressive. 
 
Other Factors which Condition Abstention 
 
Despite the fact that inherited predispositions are important, their effect is not 
determining. Networks of friends and the fact of belonging to an association may 
have an influence on behavior by reinforcing original attitudes or modifying them 
temporarily or definitively. Some adults admit that long after adolescent rebellion, the 
family political traditions impose themselves again.
 
The age factor is important and we have to take into account the 
psychological evolution of adolescence and first youth. The ideas of boys and girls 
under 22 are usually not so categorical. There is a lack of ideological 
conceptualization as well as identification with the parties. 
 
Around 23-25, the young individual usually integrates into a job and thus 
starts a process of independence from the family universe, entering into broader 
networks of relationship and exchange. 
 
Concerning attitudes and political behaviors, the differences among boys and 
girls is fairly equal. This is a substantial difference in comparison to adults. 
 
All things considered, the influence of gender increases as we go down the 
social scale. 
 
Girls from the lower-middle class and lower class express more confused 
opinions about political subjects than boys. This declared lack of interest in the 
political environment that surrounds them confirms and reproduces the traditional 
exclusion of women from politics, an area that was considered as belonging to men. 
 
The social class -subjective identification- associated with the family cultural 
background has a relevant incidence in the various abstentionist groups. It is 
noticeable that many children from working class families have never thought about 
many of the questions posed in the interview. 
 
The lack of command of the specific language and the incapacity to 
understand the concepts involved are insurmountable obstacles for communication 
and, in our opinion, sufficiently explain the abstention of some individuals. 
 
All things considered, there is no direct and clear relationship between the 
level of education of youth and conceptual clarity, which demonstrates the lack of 
any political education that might go beyond a fragmentary reading of the 
Constitution at school. 
 
Which are the factors that could make the abstentionist evolve towards higher 
political participation? It is an accepted fact that belonging to an association -be t 
political or not- may be essential to acquire an interest in collective affairs. We have 
seen during various interviews that young people who were initially apolitical, are 
politicized by a specific collective action -as happens with conscientious objectors- 
changing from lack of interest to critical abstention and, in some cases, to an 
alternative political participation. 
 
A proof that attitudes tend to constitute a coherent system is th  fact hat the 
modification of some of them may modify the whole. It can go from a worried interest 
in having to go to do the military service, to a change in their opinion of society. 
From conscientious objection to ecologism, etc. 
 
An emotional involvement in the national question is a clear factor in political 
mobilization, in accordance with the ecological analysis of the collected data. Thus, 
most of the people interviewed define themselves as non-nati alists and even the 
children of originally Catalan families do so as well. The case of the independentist 
and radical nationalists who usually practice intermittent abstention is an exception.
 
The Difference Between Abstention among Youth and Adults 
 
At the present stage of the study, the interviews to 23 adult abstentionists10 
(more than 30 years old) intend to be a point of reference in order to roughly find out 
if there were any important differences between the young boys and girls who do not 
vote. 
 
It seems clear that, as age increases, the influence of family socialization 
diminishes and the weight of one's own personal experience becomes more 
important. Historical events directly experienced -Civil War, Francoism, democratic 
transition- modulate the level of proximity/distance and confidence/distrust in political 
institutions, parties and leaders. However, this influence in not always conscious in 
the minds of the people interviewed, as is made evident throughout their discourse.
 
As age increases, we usually find people with a lower level of political 
conceptualization and, especially, strong differences between women and men in 
relation to their capacity to express standard opinions type on subjects of a strictly 
political nature. In fact, we have to bear in mind that a greater number of women that 
men refused to be interviewed. 
 
Concerning new values, the majority share them and, in some cases, not so 
much because of a real personal conviction, but because of environmental pressure 
or practical adaptation to the family reality. Many interviewed adults are "educated" 
by their children and accept the changes in customs in order to make political 
coexistence possible. 
 
It is interesting to observe that, concerning the social values which deserve 
increasing attention in public opinion since the beginning of democracy, divorce is 
only rejected by one of the interviewees and questioned by another. Homosexuality 
is almost unanimously accepted, with only one case who has doubts about it. 
Concerning abortion, the divergences increase, since four of the individuals 
interviewed oppose it radically and one accepts it on condition. Euthanasia raises 
many fears; we see 9 individuals who do not know what to think about it and one 
who is against it. 
 
The main reason for abstaining corresponds with disenchantment in politics, 
while social marginality becomes irrelevant. The disenchanted individuals of PSOE 
center their electoral withdrawal on a key date: after the 1982 elections. From this 
date onwards, and also since another significant event already mentioned, the 
NATO referendum, a decreasing interest in politics and in elections affect socialists 
more strongly. However, they are not an exception: it also happens with some former 
PSUC voters/members or former members of left radical parties. 
 
Among those who were most de-politicized, ecologism appeared to be the 
only proposal capable of motivating them. 
 
The number of declared nationalists (IX) is greater than the Spanish 
nationalists (VI); it is interesting to note -although it is in this global section and one 
has to elaborate again on the statistical value- that within the upper class (VI) we 
have not found any nationalists. This excludes their voting, if they really do vote, for 
CiU (Convergence and Union coalition), as their vote is considered to be a way of 
strengthening the center/right and not nationalism. 
 
The idea of a federal State, is only radically refused by nationalists, while it is 
welcomed by the majority. Although in some cases it is not a concept sufficiently 
meditated, it emerges as an old attractive notion for the autonomists -foreseeing an 
integration within the Spanish State or within the European Union as well as for the 
independentists, -always looking towards Europe. Although independentist 
nationalists are a minority, all the interviewees, including the Spanish nationalists 
accept Catalan independence as economically feasible. We should underline the 
fact that a common idea of anti-na ionalism is their belief that independentists want 
to isolate themselves from the international scene. 
 
The integration into Europe arouses enthusiasm as well as mistrust, the latter 
always being for economic reasons. 
 
There is a trend which although not pertaining to the majority, must be taken 
into account. It is to consider Francoism as less negative as time goes by. Its 
policies on secure employment, less drugs and delinquency, and even a better 
environment as regards social and family discipline are seen as positive. There is 
even the case of a woman belonging to the upper class who is radically Francoist; 
however, it is a unique case among interviewees. 
 
The influence of biography, related to childhood and to the family model, does 
not appear as a clearly decisive factor in choosing political options. Although in 
some cases the Francoist/Spanish nationalist or the freethinking ideology 
transmitted through parents has persisted, for the majority of the interviewees their 
own experiences and the socio-economic context in which they live have marked the 
direction taken by their thoughts, attitudes and electoral behavior. As for the upper 
class, -taking into account that the factors of social differentiation can explain 
electoral behavior and, especially, the arguments which explain this behavior- non-
implication, individualism and Spanish nationalism appear to be more evident than in 
the other cases. 
 
On the other hand, despite the contradictory character that is ascribed to the 
new middle classes -perhaps it would be more correct to qualify it as 
accommodating-, the interviewees who belong to this social group appear to be 
more involved than the ones belonging to upper classes. We also have to highlight 
their capacity to develop a left and nationalist discourse. We should not forget the 
almost absolute absence of Spanish nationalists. It is within this social class that we 
find more people declaring themselves to be Catalanists and supporters of the right. 
 
As for the working class, the majority places itself to the left, while 
nationalism, although it exists,  is not so present as in the middle strata, being 
surpassed by social class discourse. The implication in social movements, but not in 
politics, becomes very clear, especially among the residents in Nou Barris, a district 
that is traditionally vindicative. This fact clearly shows the weight of environment in 
social assumptions and behaviors. 
 
There is more confidence in the actions of the community as a tool to change 
society among the residents in Nou Barris than in any of the other six districts where 
interviews where carried out. It is a position that often appears to contrast the official 
work of politicians, especially in the case of the lower class. Among the upper and 
middle classes the weight of public demonstrations and of popular rights movements 
is of lesser importance. 
 
 
A TYPOLOGY  
 
A schematic classification of abstentionists in relation to their level of 
politicization (Table 2), has to be based on a fundamental division: the distinction 
between a low and a high level. To define a dividing line, we have taken into account 
the respective individual levels of knowledge, interest, evaluation capacity and of 
practice in relation to each person. 
 
Table2 
 
Within the low level of politicization we can identify three groups: 
 
1) The so called "confirmed abstentionists" which constitute structural 
abstention. In this group politicization is non-existent, since they lack information, 
interest, capacity to evaluate and practice. Their abstention does not originate in a 
more or less grounded decision, but in their social marginalization and, therefore, 
political marginalization, too. 
 
2) Those who abstain because they are only spectators of political life, 
receive news but don't have enough education or interest to interpret them, making it 
difficult for them to previously make any kind of evaluation of the political action of 
voting. They share with the confirmed abstentionists the feeling of remaining outside 
politics; however, they are somehow conscious that they are within the system and, 
in situations of electoral hyper-mobilization in their environment, they may vote by 
mimicry (1977, 1982). 
 
3) Those who abstain because they do not have a defined ideology; they 
have enough knowledge but suffer from a strong lack of interest and do not have 
enough capacity to evaluate since frequently they don't have a clear hierarchy of 
preferences. Therefore, it is difficult for them to decide themselves on one or another 
option. They are often people brought up within authoritarian or conservative 
families, generally passive supporters of the previous regime who, at present and 
because of environmental pressure, claim to be democrats. Nevertheless, at an 
unconscious level, they reject political pluralism and are of the opinion that parties 
create divisions and conflicts. 
 
Within the high level of politicization, we may distinguish two groups: 
 
1) The abstentionists who practice a passive criticism know enough about the 
political reality. They are interested in it, but also dismayed by the negative evolution 
of the representative political bodies. In the past, they were involved  politics but 
they now feel deceived and doubt about their power to influence social reality. They 
also doubt if parties with governing options could really change their essential 
problems. 
 
2) Those who abstain because of their high level of politicization take the 
position of active criticism. To their knowledge and interest they add a whole series 
of alternative political actions. In this group there are mainly young people, often the 
children of progressive families who have internalized new values (pacifi m, 
ecologism, feminism) and who are active in alternative political platforms. 
 
Thus, in this general classification the basic axes are the greater or lesser 
integration within the political system in power and the historical generation to which 
they belong. In the first two cases, this second factor does not count for much since 
their lack of integration does not correspond to ideological motivation but to generic 
social causes, in which political conscience is, by definition, inexistent. On the other
hand, the third and fourth group, since they come respectively from sectors favorable 
or opposing the previous regime, share the same ideological rejection, although they 
are of opposing political tendencies. Some are marked by what they had, and others 
by what they expected to obtain. Both groups share the frustration of their ideals 
although the second group appears to be more conscious of it. The fifth group joins 
the fourth in its criticism of the system. But, in many cases, they belong to a 
generation that, not having lived through the democratic change, does not criticize 
because expectations have not been fulfilled, but because they have new 
expectations they do not want to see frustrated again. The disenchantment of their 
parents’ generation ratifies their attitude, although, unlike them, they believe in 
active criticism by participating in other actions alternative to that of voting. 
 
From the point of view of the political system, convinced abstentionists are the 
consequence of the social marginalization which neither Francoism nor the 
democratic regime have been able to stop. The second group is a victim of the lack 
of interest in political education on the part of the present regime. The same 
happens with the third group in relation to Francoism. The fourth and the fifth 
express the limits of the present democracy. 
 
If we were to correlate the left wing voters (Table 1) with the various types of 
abstentionists (Table 2) we would see the incidence in these of the different factors 
which condition electoral choice. 
 
1) The convinced abstentionists of the first group have a personal background 
and a socioeconomic status which leaves them outside the system. Their family 
environment and the networks of relationships outside the family either do not exist 
or are placed within marginalization, which reinforces their marginality from politics 
even more. On the other hand, the action that institutions exert on them through 
parties and leaders, through policies and governmental programs and through the 
transmission role of the media, does almost nothing to alter their situation and, 
therefore is experienced as something alien which does not affect them. If by any 
chance they at some point thought about the possibility of voting, their predisposition 
and habits incline them towards abstention. Their opinions and beliefs are the clear 
reflection of their mental predisposition and of their experience of marginality. 
Without any ideology or information, their evaluation of available options is 
impossible. And, concerning their preferences, they are not even free to have them. 
In fact, they cannot freely decide in any sense. They are forced into non-
participation. 
 
2) The abstentionist pectators of politics, have a historical, cultural, personal 
and family background as well as a socio-economic status which does not allow 
them to have enough knowledge to understand politics. Their spatial status and their 
networks of relationships outside the family correspond coherently to their situation. 
Everything leads them to be more receptive to the action of the media (their main 
source of knowledge) and, therefore, to see slightly more close at hand, the 
protagonists of the political "show." However, their difficulty in understanding "what 
is happening" reduces their interest and makes any kind of political practice 
impossible. Without ideology or minimally organized and understandable 
information, they let themselves be led by their individual predispositions and by the 
opinions and beliefs which, in their environment, are usually skeptical and pragmatic 
in the short- erm, inheriting a family tradition that is anti-politics. Their capacity to 
evaluate options being so reduced, only some specific irrational preferences (the 
sympathy for a leader, for instance), could lead them to vote. This very same 
irrationality would be at the basis of their mobilization in "spectacular" political 
circumstances: the end of Francoism and the beginning of "something" new; the 
promise of a "change", interpreted in a Messianic way; the "exemplar punishment” of 
a leader who, in the end, appeared to be a selfish opportunist, etc. 
 
3) The abstentionists of the third group with a low level of politicization have a 
general background which has nurtured anti-democratic predispositions, opinions 
and beliefs in them. The environmental pressure leads them to passively adapt 
themselves to the democratic system; however, the information they receive through 
the media and the political discourse of the parties appears strongly filtered by 
predispositions and beliefs, more explicit in adults and often unconscious in youth. 
Although they almost always show a preference for conservative leaders, their 
distrust of the system ends up extending to these. Thus, they doubt about either 
integrating into the system by voting or maintaining a passive attitude -as they 
always do- within the system. They cannot calculate the preferences precisely 
because their preferences are too intense and misdirected. 
 
4) The fourth group, the one which practices passive critical abstention has a 
personal, family and social background which has made its politicization possible 
and, therefore, is sensitive to institutions’ policies and to the information in the 
media. Nevertheless, their partisan identification is in crisis when it is contrasted wi h 
the concrete practice of the parties in which they once believed. They still have 
confidence in some leaders, but they feel frustrated in their deep beliefs and the 
generalized discouragement among their closest networks of relationships (including 
the family) undermines their solidarity dimension. Within these groups we may find 
many former voters of PSOE who can still be mobilized on specific occasions where 
a given situation is perceived as being quite an extremely equal electoral 
confrontation between the Right and the Left. 
 
5) The last group, the group of active critical abstention shares along with the 
previous one the same background. As the majority of them are young, the family 
environment may strengthen their abstentionism, this being o ther because they 
belong to the frustrated group, or because they belong to the "conformist" electorate, 
thus representing a situation from which the children would like to distance 
themselves. 
 
Their networks of relationships reinforce this attitude. The political 
information, instead of being a tool for persuasion, may have, in this case, a 
revulsive reaction. The idealist and radical predispositions lead them to make such 
demanding preferences that they cannot find any political option with governing 
options which could answer to such a level of demands. In some cases, and with a 
testimonial attitude, they vote for an extra-parli mentarian party. Their high level of 
politicization and their capacity for grasping some specific critical situations which, 
they believe, may question the very same existence of democracy, makes them 
sometimes vote for a lesser evil. Nevertheless, their usual action in politics is 
through other extra-electoral channels which are focused on questions such as 
peace, human rights, environment, minorities, etc… 
 
Very few take the traditional revolutionary path. At present, their "utopia" is 
that of a different society. 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Table 2 
 
 
NOTES 
 
(1) See Col· lecció Estudis Electorals ed. by the Equip de Sociologia Electoral (UAB) and the 
Fundació Jaume Bofill. 
 
(2) Sixty to young abstentionists, twenty-four to young people who have always voted, and twenty-
three to adults who have not participated in more than one election. 
 
(3) BECK, P.A. and JENNINGS, M.K.: "Pathways to participation", American Political Science 
Review, 76, 1982. 
 
(4) VIRÓS, PARÉS, ALBAIGÉS and al.: Socialització política dels adolescents de les comarques del 
Vallès, Caixa de Sabadell, 1978. VIRÓS, R. and TRESSERRA, M.: "Procesos de socialización 
política en Cataluña", Universidad y Sociedad, 4. 
 
(5) CASSEL, C.A.: "Issues in Measurement. The Levels of Conceptualization and Index of Ideological 
Sophistication", American Journal of Political Science, 28, 1984. FISKE, S.T., LAU, R. AND SMITH, 
R.A.: "On the Varieties and Utilities of Political Expertise", Social Cognition, 8, 1990. 
 
(6) DALTON, R.J. et al.: The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society. Princeton 
N.J., Princeton U. Press, 1984. LANE, J.E. et al.: Political Data Handbook: OECD Countries. New 
York, Oxford U. Press, 1991. SMILDER, Ann: "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies", American 
Sociological Review, 51, 1986. INGLEHART, R.: El cambio cultural en las sociedades industriales 
avanzadas. Madrid, CIS, Siglo XXI, 1991. 
 
(7) The Institut Municipal d´Estadística, with whom we had previously made a compromise of 
confidentiality, provided a list of voters who had not voted in at least one lection. When we had 
agreed by phone on a date for the interview we did not say that the subject was abstention but 
"attitudes in relation to society and politics." 
 
(8) See in the appendix the outline of the interviews. 
 
(9) The persons interviewed place themselves without any difficulty, which clearly confirms a clear 
internalization of a hierarchical society. 
 
(10) The analysis of this interview has been carried out by Eulàlia Solé. 
 
 
 
ORIENTATIONAL SCHEME FOR THE INTERVIEWS 
 
1. Biography 
 
I.- Family Model. Origins of the father, mother and grandparents. Educational level of the parents and 
profession. Religious and political ideology. Interest in politics. Authoritarian or participative family 
model. Relationship with the father, mother and siblings. Co flict/dialogue. 
Is there diversification in the male/female roles? Global satisfaction in family life. 
 
II.- Educational Training. Type of school. Level of satisfaction with school and studies. Professional 
and future projects. 
 
III.- Work/Unemployment. Professional career (if required). 
 
IV.- Social Relationships and Cultural Life. Most usual hobbies, last book, last movie, last play. 
Preferred music. Civic and sports associations. Friends. 
 
V.- Value System. Values transmitted through the family. Va ues transmitted by the school. Which are 
the values that you would like to transmit to your children (obedience, politeness, solidarity, freedom, 
equality, saving, tolerance, etc.)? Meaning of life. Transcendence. Conservatism-P ogressiveness. 
Attitude towards divorce, abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia... 
 
 
2. Political Culture 
 
VI.- Attitudes Towards Society. Implication/distance. Most important problems. Ability to influence. 
Participative or spectator attitude. Degree of satisfaction with the present soci ty. 
 
VII.- Identification with Catalonia. N tionalist feelings of the interviewee. Opinions on nationalism and 
independentism. Opinion about La Crida, Terra Lliure, Moviment de Defensa de la Terra. 
 
VIII.- Interest in Politics. Relation with parties, trade unions, or any alternative group -ecologist, for 
peace, feminist, anarchist-. Regular information channels (newspaper, radio, TV (channels 1, 2, 3). 
Knowledge about the Constitution and the State. 
 
IX.- Agents for Political Socialization. Family, school, friends, associations, parties, trade unions, 
media... 
 
X.- Political Transition. Evaluation of Francoism. Evaluation of democracy. Evaluation of the State of 
the Autonomies. 
 
XI.- Institutions. Knowledge and evaluation of Trade Unions, Management Associations, Parties, 
Central Government, Generalitat, Town Councils, Catalan Parliament, Chamber of Deputies, Senate, 
the Army, and the Church. 
 
XII.- Political Ideology. Right-Left concepts. Self-placement on the Right-Left axis. 
 
XIII.- Electoral Participation. Electoral trajectory. Intermittent participation or constant abstention. 
Motivations. 
 
XIV.- Europe. Level of identification. Advantages and disadvantages of a united Europe. 
 
XV.- The Ideal Catalonia. Political system. Party systems. State model (Autonomies, Federal State, 
Unitarian State, Independence ...) 
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